Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation by Buechel, Berno & Hellmann, Tim
Rev. Econ. Design (2012) 16:71–87
DOI 10.1007/s10058-012-0114-x
ORIGINAL PAPER
Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role
of externalities in strategic network formation
Berno Buechel · Tim Hellmann
Received: 17 February 2011 / Accepted: 31 January 2012 / Published online: 15 February 2012
© Springer-Verlag 2012
Abstract Since the seminal contribution of Jackson and Wolinsky (J Econ Theory
71(1):44–74, 1996) it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social net-
works exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective
outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency.
We approach this omission by analyzing the role of positive and negative external-
ities of link formation. This yields general results that relate situations of positive
externalities with stable networks that cannot be “too dense” in a well-defined sense,
while situations with negative externalities tend to induce “too dense” networks. Those
results are neither restricted to specific assumptions on the agents’ preferences (e.g.
homogeneity), nor to a specific notion of stability or efficiency.
Keywords Networks · Connections · Externalities · Spillovers · Stability · Efficiency
JEL Classification D85 · C72 · L14
1 Introduction
As in non-cooperative game theory, a central issue in the theory of network formation is
the analysis of equilibrium or stability, i.e. a situation where no player wants to change
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his links. Myerson (1991) proposes a simultaneous move game of network formation,
where players announce their desired links non-cooperatively, but the standard formu-
lation of Nash equilibrium in the Myerson network formation game has proved to be a
non-satisfying concept due to coordination problems.1 In the seminal contribution of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) this problem is solved by introducing a different concept
of stability called pairwise stability. In a pairwise stable network no two players want
to form a mutual link and no player wants to cut a link unilaterally. This concept of
stability is used and has been refined widely in the literature of network formation
games. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) highlight a central problem in strategic network
formation: There is a tension between stability and efficiency, meaning that individual
interest can be at odds with societal welfare.2 Since then, there was a flourishing
literature on specific situations of strategic network formation of which two small
surveys can be found in Jackson (2004) and Goyal and Joshi (2006b). Indeed, in
various models it can be observed that stable networks do not coincide with efficient
networks.
What has not been explicitly studied are the sources of inefficiency. The question
is particularly, how do stable networks generally differ from efficient networks? And,
being in an inefficient (e.g. stable) situation, how can welfare be improved without
reshuffling the whole network structure?
We approach these questions by analyzing the role of externalities (also called
spillovers) of link formation. Simply put, positive externalities define situations where
agents can profit (at least do not suffer) from others who form a relationship; while
negative externalities mean that they do not benefit from that action. We argue that
both types of externalities correspond to natural settings. Network formation games
where direct and indirect connections are the source of benefits represent examples
for positive externalities. On the other hand, in a context of competition or rival goods,
negative externalities occur.
For our analysis, we employ several notions of stability and efficiency. In partic-
ular, we use three well-known notions of stability: pairwise stability, as introduced
in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), pairwise Nash stability, a simple refinement of the
former which incorporates the property of Nash equilibrium, and pairwise stability
with transfers, which stems from a network formation game allowing for transfers.3
For the analysis of the welfare properties of the stable networks, we use a very general
set of welfare functions, which have to satisfy only a monotonicity property.4 Given a
welfare function, we introduce the notion of over-connected and under-connected net-
works. While usually networks are classified as either efficient (welfare maximizing) or
1 Any link that is desired by both players is not necessarily present in Nash equilibrium if neither player
announces it, e.g. the empty network is always an equilibrium.
2 See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Theorem 1, for the general statement about the tension of pairwise
stable and efficient networks. Note that this can be relaxed for strongly stable networks (see Dutta and
Mutuswami 1997, Theorem 4.19.).
3 See Bloch and Jackson (2007) for different approaches to network formation with transfers. For a com-
parison of the equilibrium concepts see Bloch and Jackson (2006) and Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2009).
4 The utilitarian welfare function, the sum of individual utilities, satisfies this notion. For some of the
results, we actually need this specific version of a welfare function.
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inefficient, the two notions further describe inefficient networks. In essence, a network
is over-connected if welfare can be improved by deleting some links, while a network
is under-connected if an addition of links is welfare improving. We show how these
notions help identify the sources of inefficiency and can be applied to characterizing
stable and efficient networks.
The main result for positive externalities is that there is no stable network that is
over-connected (Theorem 1). This result holds directly for the notion of pairwise Nash
stability, while it takes an additional assumption (“concavity”) to make it hold for the
notion of pairwise stability. The result is, however, not dependent on the particular
shape of the utility functions nor on the degree of homogeneity. A direct interpretation
of Theorem 1 is that under positive externalities a stable network cannot be socially
improved by the severance of links. In fact, the statement is even stronger: Under
positive externalities any network that is contained in a pairwise Nash stable network
is weakly Pareto dominated by the former. We illustrate the implications of the result in
an example taken from the literature, the connections model (cf. Jackson and Wolinsky
1996).
For negative externalities a corresponding result cannot be established immediately.
In the context of transfers, however, there is an analogous result: No stable network
is under-connected (Theorem 2). This means that under negative externalities no sta-
ble network can be socially improved by the addition of links. While the qualitative
statement is analogue to Theorem 1 on positive externalities, the two results differ
significantly: Theorem 2 applies to the notion of pairwise stability with transfers, it
requires an additional assumption (“concavity”), and it is restricted to a special case of
a welfare function (the sum of individual utilities). We discuss why these restrictions
are needed under negative externalities and how they can be relaxed. Finally, we apply
Theorem 2 to a model of patent races (Goyal and Joshi 2006b) to illustrate how our
results can contribute to and extend previous results on the characterization of the set
of stable networks (Proposition 2).
Our results are applicable to many network formation games from the literature.
Examples for positive externalities include the provision of a pure public good and a
model of market sharing agreements (both introduced in Goyal and Joshi 2006b); and
the connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). Examples for negative external-
ities include the model of patent races (Goyal and Joshi 2006b), a co-author model
(Jackson and Wolinsky 1996), and a model of free trade agreements (Goyal and Joshi
2006a).
This paper is organized as follows: The subsequent Sect. 2 formally defines the
model. The results on positive externalities are presented and discussed in Sect. 3. The
results on negative externalities are presented and discussed in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we
conclude.
2 Model and definitions
Let N = {1, . . ., n} be a set of agents/players, with n ≥ 3. A network g is a set
of unordered pairs {i, j} with i = j ∈ N , that represent the bilateral relations.
Thus, i j := {i, j} ∈ g means that player i and player j are linked in network g.
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Let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size two and let G be the set of all possible
graphs, G = {g : g ⊆ gN }. By Ni (g) we denote the neighbors of player i in network
g, Ni (g) := { j ∈ N | i j ∈ g}. Similarly, Li (g) denotes the set of player i ′s links in
g, Li (g) := {i j ∈ g | j ∈ N }. We define di (g) := |Li (g)| = |Ni (g)|, as the number
of player i ′s links, called player i ′s degree.
For each player i ∈ N a utility function ui : G → R expresses his preferences over
the set of possible graphs. u = (u1, . . ., un) denotes the profile of utility functions.
Decisions to form or to sever links typically do not depend on absolute utility, but on
changes in utility. Let mui (g, l) be the marginal utility of player i of deleting a set of
links l in network g, that is mui (g, l) := ui (g) − ui (g\l) for l ⊆ g. Equivalently, we
denote mui (g ∪ l, l) := ui (g ∪ l) − ui (g) as the marginal utility of adding the set of
links l to network g.
From the vast literature of network formation, we employ three of the most com-
mon stability notions. The first notion is based on a cooperative framework and was
introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Pairwise Stability. A network g is pairwise stable (PS) if no link will be cut by a
single player, and no two players want to form a link:
(i) ∀i j ∈ g, ui (g) ≥ ui (g\i j) and u j (g) ≥ u j (g\i j), and
(ii) ∀i j /∈ g, ui (g ∪ i j) > ui (g) ⇒ u j (g ∪ i j) < u j (g).
This well-known definition captures the idea that links can be severed by any involved
player, whereas the formation of a link requires the consent of both players. Pairwise
stability is a basic notion that can be refined in multiple ways. One of the refinements
is the property of pairwise Nash stability. A network is pairwise Nash stable (PNS) if
there exists a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding link formation game (see Myerson
1991) that supports this network and no link will be added by two players. This boils
down to the following conditions.
Pairwise Nash Stability. A network g is pairwise Nash stable (PNS) if the following
holds:
(i) ∀i ∈ N ,  ∃l ⊆ Li (g) : ui (g\l) > ui (g) and
(ii) ∀i j /∈ g, ui (g ∪ i j) > ui (g) ⇒ u j (g ∪ i j) < u j (g).
In contrast to pairwise stability, pairwise Nash stability captures the idea that players
are able to delete multiple links simultaneously. The third notion of stability is based
on the idea of transfers and can be found in Bloch and Jackson (2007).
Pairwise Stability with Transfers. A network g is pairwise stable with transfers
(PST) if there does not exist any pair of players that can jointly benefit by adding,
respectively cutting, their link:
(i) ∀i j ∈ g, ui (g) + u j (g) ≥ ui (g\i j) + u j (g\i j) and
(ii) ∀i j /∈ g, ui (g) + u j (g) ≥ ui (g ∪ i j) + u j (g ∪ i j).
We denote by [P S(u)], [P N S(u)], and [P ST (u)] the sets of pairwise stable, pair-
wise Nash stable, and pairwise stable networks with transfers, respectively, for a given
profile u of utility functions.
While stability tries to answer which networks emerge based on individual prefer-
ences, efficiency addresses the evaluation of networks from a societal point of view.
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To formally capture efficiency, we use a welfare functionw : G → R that typically (but
not necessarily) is only dependent on the vector of utilities of all players, given a net-
work g. The most commonly used version of a welfare function is the utilitarian welfare
function, which simply sums up the utility of all players, wu(g) = ∑i∈N ui (g). For
some of our results, however, an even weaker way of aggregating utility is sufficient.
We only require a welfare function to satisfy the following property.
Definition 1 A welfare function w satisfies monotonicity if
(i) ui (g) ≥ ui (g′) ∀i ∈ N ⇒ w(g) ≥ w(g′), and
(ii) ui (g) ≥ ui (g′) ∀i ∈ N and ∃ j ∈ N : u j (g) > u j (g′) ⇒ w(g) > w(g′).
This assumption is a very weak requirement for a welfare function: A welfare function
should evaluate a network g at least as high as a network g′ if all players i ∈ N evaluate
g at least as high as g′. Monotonicity assures that the welfare function preserves the
Pareto ordering of the networks. Given a welfare function w, let us define efficiency.
Efficiency. A network g∗ is called efficient with respect to the welfare function w
if it is a welfare maximizing network, that is w(g∗) ≥ w(g) ∀g ∈ G.
We introduce the following two definitions in order to describe non-efficient net-
works.
Definition 2 A network g is called over-connected (with respect to the welfare func-
tion w) if ∃g′ ⊂ g such that w(g′) > w(g).
Definition 3 A network g is called under-connected (with respect to the welfare
function w) if ∃g′ ⊃ g such that w(g′) > w(g).
A network is over-connected if it is “too dense” in the sense that overall welfare
can be improved by cutting links. Similarly, under-connected networks are “not dense
enough”. Efficient networks are neither over-connected nor under-connected. Ineffi-
cient networks, however, can satisfy both, one, or none of these two properties. To
shed some light into the tension between stability and efficiency, we will ask whether
and under what conditions stable networks are over-connected or not under-connected,
respectively under-connected or not over-connected.
3 Positive externalities
Positive externalities in network formation games simply capture that players experi-
ence positive effects on their utility when others form a link. As defined below, a link
formed by two players cannot decrease other players’ utility.5
Definition 4 A utility function ui satisfies positive externalities if ∀g ∈ G,∀ jk : i ∈
{ j, k}, it holds that
ui (g ∪ jk) ≥ ui (g).
5 Externalities in this case capture the effects of the decision of two players forming a link on other players’
utility. This is different to the meaning of externalities in the context of markets. Note also that we have not
required that the inequalities are strict.
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A profile of utility functions u satisfies positive externalities if all utility functions
satisfy positive externalities.
Being required for any network, any link, and any player, this property seems to be
quite restrictive. However, we argue that this property is apparent in many contexts of
network formation. Some examples from the literature are provision of a pure public
good (Goyal and Joshi 2006b), market sharing agreements (Belleflamme and Bloch
2004), and the connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996), which we discuss
below.
In case of a utility function that is additive separable into costs and benefits, positive
externalities are implied by a simple monotonicity property of the benefit function. In
this context, players have to carry the costs of their own links, but share the benefits
with others. Intuitively, individual incentives to establish a link might be lower than
its collective value because of positive externalities.
Theorem 1 formalizes this intuition. More precisely, it shows that a pairwise Nash
stable network can never be socially improved by the deletion of links.
Theorem 1 If a profile of utility functions u satisfies positive externalities, then no
pairwise Nash stable network is over-connected with respect to any monotonic welfare
function w.
The proof of this and all following statements can be found in the “Appendix”. To
prove this result, we show that no player is better off in a subnetwork g′ of a pairwise
Nash stable network g. Pairwise Nash stability implies that a player cannot prefer a
network g˜(⊂ g) that has only been reduced by some of his own links. Because of
positive externalities, he cannot prefer a subnetwork g′ ⊂ g˜ of the reduced network.
The argument holds for any player such that the monotonicity property of the welfare
function establishes the result. Note that this also implies that a pairwise stable network
weakly Pareto dominates any subnetwork: Deleting links makes no player better off.
In the proof of Theorem 1 we use the property of pairwise Nash stable networks
that no player can benefit by unilaterally severing a set of own links.6 With the notion
of pairwise stability, however, each link is considered one by one. In order to apply
Theorem 1 to the weaker notion of pairwise stability we need an additional assumption.
Definition 5 A utility function ui is concave (in own links) if ∀g ∈ G, and ∀li ⊂
Li (gN\g),∀i j ∈ g it holds that
mui (g, i j) ≥ mui (g ∪ li , i j).
A profile of utility functions is concave if all utility functions are concave.
The property requires that the marginal utility of a link is decreasing in the set of
links the player has already. Hellmann (2009) shows that this concavity property is
equivalent to two notions we find in the literature (see Lemma 2 in the “Appendix”).
6 Note that we picked pairwise Nash stability for illustrative reasons. In fact the proof of Theorem 1 shows
that Nash stability, i.e. property (i) of pairwise Nash stability, is already sufficient for the result.
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Concavity builds a bridge between the notion of pairwise Nash stability and pairwise
stability: If a profile of utility functions is concave, then the two stability notions
coincide, that is [P N S(u)] = [P S(u)].7 Thus, we get the following Corollary to
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose a profile of utility functions u satisfies positive externalities
and concavity, then no pairwise stable network is over-connected with respect to any
monotonic welfare function w.
What has been implied by pairwise Nash stability in Theorem 1, is now assured
by pairwise stability together with the assumption of concavity: In a stable network
no player can improve by cutting a set of his links. The notions of stability that are
used in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are fairly weak. The statement, also applies to
any refinement of pairwise stability, e.g. bilateral stability (Goyal and Vega-Redondo
2007), unilateral stability (Buskens and van de Rijt 2008), strong stability (Dutta and
Mutuswami 1997), and weak stability (Dutta and Mutuswami 1997). Moroever, for
the notion of pairwise stability with transfers it is possible to state a similar result,
which is however restricted to the utilitarian welfare function.
Theorem 1 excluding over-connectedness has trivial implications for the complete
and empty network: As any network is a subnetwork of the complete network, it
follows that (a) if the complete network is stable, then it must also be efficient. Since
any network is a supernetwork of the empty network it follows that, (b) if the empty
network is uniquely efficient, then no other network can be stable. Next, we show how
Theorem 1 applies to a model from the literature.
The connections model revisited
The connections model was introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It models
the flow of resources (like information or support) via shortest paths in a network. Let
di j (g) denote the distance of players i and j in network g (which is defined to be ∞
for unconnected pairs), then the utility of each player can be written as
uC Oi (g) = wi i +
∑
j =i
δdi j (g)wi j −
∑
j :i j∈g
ci j , wi th δ ∈ (0, 1). (1)
wi j stands for the undiscounted value of a connection to player j and ci j stands for
the cost of maintaining a link with agent j . It is easy to see that the connections
model satisfies positive externalities. If i j forms in some network g, then the utility
of a player k = {i, j} either does not change or increases as some of k′s distances
are shortened because dkm(g ∪ i j) ≤ dkm(g) for all m. Consequently (by Theo-
rem 1), no Nash stable network can be over-connected w.r.t. any monotonic welfare
function.
Moreover, it can be shown that uC O (·) satisfies concavity. By the result of Hellmann
(2009) it suffices to show that uC O satisfies convexity in own current links, that is
7 See Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2009).
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∀i ∈ N ,∀g ∈ G, and ∀l ⊆ Li (g), it holds that mui (g, l) ≥ ∑i j∈l mui (g, i j). This
has been done by Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2009) for the symmetric connections
model. We make a straightforward generalization of their proof.8
Lemma 1 The heterogeneous connections model satisfies concavity in own links.
Consequently (by Corollary 1), no pairwise stable network can be over-connected
w.r.t. any monotonic welfare function. While stable networks depend on the dyadic
specifications of value and costs (wi j , ci j ), the results excluding over-connectedness
imply that the welfare of a stable network can never be improved by severing links.
There are more specific results for the connections model in its symmetric version,
setting wi j = 1, ci j = c(∀i = j) and considering the utilitarian welfare function
wu only. This has been studied in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Jackson (2003), and
Hummon (2000). Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, Prop. 1 and Prop. 2) show that for low
costs (c < δ − δ2) the complete network is efficient (and uniquely pairwise stable);
for medium costs (δ − δ2 < c < δ + n−22 δ2) the star network is efficient; while for
very high costs (c > δ + n−22 δ2) the empty network is efficient. The famous statement
of inefficiency in the connections model is the following: “For δ < c, any pairwise
stable network which is non-empty is such that each player has at least two links and
thus is inefficient”.9
What does our result excluding over-connectedness add to this discussion of inef-
ficiency? First, there is the above mentioned trivial implication (b) for the empty
network: Since any network is a supernetwork of the empty network, it follows that
if the empty network is uniquely efficient, then no other network can be stable. Thus,
the statement of inefficiency is restricted to δ < c < δ + n−22 δ2. Second, the result on
over-connectedness adds a new point of view on the flavor of inefficiency. This can be
illustrated in the following example which is also taken from Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996, Ex. 1).
Example 1 The network in Fig. 1, called “Tetrahedron”, is stable for costs c > δ,
where the star network is uniquely efficient.10 The Tetrahedron is “too dense” in the
sense that it has 18 links, while the efficient network has 15. Accordingly, Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996, p. 51) label it as “over-connected”. However, by Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1, it is not over-connected according to the definition used in this paper.
This means that the welfare of the Tetrahedron cannot be improved by leaving out
any set of its links. Moreover, we claim that the Tetrahedron is under-connected in
the parameter range for which it is pairwise stable. In the “Appendix” (Proposition 1)
we show that the addition of a link between the players “2” and “13” would strictly
improve utilitarian welfare. The same point as in the Tetrahedron can be illustrated in
many other stable networks in the connections model: they are under-connected for
any costs for which they are pairwise stable.
8 In fact, such a generalization can be made for any “distance-based” utility function in the sense that
benefits are decreasing with distances and costs only depend on direct links.
9 cf. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), p. 51.
10 More precisely, gT etra is pairwise stable iff δ − δ5 + δ2 − δ4 + δ2 − δ5 + 2(δ3 − δ4) ≤ c ≤
δ − δ8 + δ2 − δ7 + δ3 − δ6 + 2(δ4 − δ5).
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Fig. 1 Example of an inefficient network (“Tetrahedron”)
The example illustrates two different viewpoints on inefficiency. From the viewpoint
of a social planner that can unrestrictedly manipulate a given network, some stable
networks are “too dense” in the sense that less links are needed to form the efficient one.
From the viewpoint of a social planner who is restricted to either foster or hinder the
formation of links (e.g. by taxes or subsidies), many stable networks in the connections
model are “not dense enough” (under-connected), while none is “too dense” (over-
connected).
4 Negative externalities
Negative externalities in network formation occur, when the addition of a link cannot
be beneficial for the players who are not involved in this link. Formally, we speak of
negative externalities if the following holds.
Definition 6 A utility function ui satisfies negative externalities if ∀g ∈ G,∀ jk : i ∈
{ j, k}, it holds that
ui (g ∪ jk) ≤ ui (g).
A profile of utility functions u satisfies negative externalities if all utility functions
satisfy negative externalities.
When considering negative externalities in economics, equilibrium analysis usually
shows that individuals rather do “too much” (pollute, etc.) than being socially optimal.
Players facing negative externalities are thus expected to create “too dense” networks.
One example is the co-author model introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In this
model, a researcher who forms a new collaboration does not internalize the negative
effects on her current collaborators. Formally, it can be shown that any pairwise stable
network in this co-author model is over-connected with respect to utilitarian welfare.
However, such a result does not hold in all models satisfying negative externalities. It
may even happen that a stable network is under-connected because of the following
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reason. It might happen that a player rejects a link that is highly beneficial to the
proposing player. This link could potentially lead to higher welfare.11
A simple way out of this issue is using the stability concept pairwise stability with
transfers. This concept helps ensure that any single link that is not contained in a
pairwise stable network with transfers cannot be welfare improving. Analogously to
Corollary 1, we require concavity (see Definition 5) for our main result on negative
externalities to ensure that there is no set of links that would improve welfare.
Theorem 2 Suppose a profile of utility functions u satisfies negative externalities and
concavity, then no network g ∈ G, which is pairwise stable with transfers, is under-
connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
As always, the proof can be found in the “Appendix”. Pairwise stability with
transfers differs from pairwise stability significantly. In general, neither [P S(u)] ⊆
[P ST (u)] nor [P S(u)] ⊇ [P ST (u)]. Although the concepts differ, we can easily
find properties of the utility function that are sufficient to ensure equivalence of both
stability concepts. It can be shown that the property of pairwise sign compatibility in
Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) is sufficient for [P S(u)] = [P ST (u)]. Thus, from
Theorem 2 we can conclude that also no pairwise stable network (and hence no
Pairwise Nash stable network) is under-connected in the presence of pairwise sign
compatibility, negative externalities, and concavity.
For the results, so far, it has been crucial whether network formation requires
bilateral consent or can be done unilaterally. In the definitions of pairwise stability
and pairwise Nash stability, it is implicitly assumed that link deletion can be done
unilaterally, while link creation requires the consent of both involved players. If we
allow for opposite link formation rules, then the assumptions made for the result on
negative externalities, i.e. Theorem 2, are required for excluding over-connectedness
in the presence of positive externalities, while the non-under-connectedness of stable
networks in case of negative externalities are then analogous to the results we have on
positive externalities.12 For example, pairwise Nash stability incorporates deviations of
simultaneously deleting several links. If we consider a stability notion that incorporates
the players’ ability to unilaterally add a set of links, we can formulate a result that is
fully analogous to Theorem 1: Networks that are stable in that sense, can be shown to
be not under-connected with respect to any monotonic welfare function.
There are many examples in the literature of network formation which satisfy
negative externalities (and other properties required for Theorem 2).13 The co-author
model introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is mentioned above. Goyal and Joshi
(2006a) present a model of free trade agreements that satisfies negative externalities.
In order to apply Theorem 2 we need concavity, which only holds on a restricted
domain, G˜ := {g ∈ G | di (g) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ N }. However, we can extend Theorem 2
11 This issue can also be considered as some kind of external effect. However, we prefer to distinguish
utility considerations of the directly involved agents from effects to non-involved agents.
12 Thus, our results can be restated in terms of bilateral or unilateral link creation/deletion rules or by using
notions of addition proofness and deletion proofness.
13 Any example mentioned in this paper is discussed more extensively (with respect to our results) in an
earlier working paper version (Buechel and Hellmann 2009).
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straightforwardly to a restricted domain. Thus, we conclude that no stable network
g ∈ G˜ is under-connected within the set of networks G˜ in that model of free trade
agreements. Finally, Goyal and Joshi (2006b) introduce a model of Patent Races. As an
example of Theorem 2, we discuss this model more intensively in the next subsection.
Patent races
Goyal and Joshi (2006b) derive this model as a variation of the classical patent race
model.14 In addition to the classical model, firms can join R&D collaborations to
accelerate research. The first firm to develop the new product is awarded a patent. The
random time τ(di (g)) at which the innovation happens is given by
Pr({τ(di (g)) ≤ t}) = 1 − exp(−di (g)t).
Assuming risk neutrality, payoff of 1 in case of receiving the patent and 0 else, and
a discount factor ρ, the expected payoff of firm i is the following:
u P Ri
(
di (g), D(g−i )
)
= Et
[
exp(−ρt)Pr(τ (di (g)) = t) j =i Pr(τ (d j (g)) > t)
]
− di (g)c
= di (g)
ρ + D(g) − di (g)c =
di (g)
ρ + 2di (g) + D(g−i ) − di (g)c,
where g−i represents the network obtained by deleting player i and all his links and
D(g) := ∑i∈N di (g). This model satisfies negative externalities since links of other
firms reduce the probability to innovate first. Also, since u P Ri is a concave function
of di (g), it is concave according to Definition 5. From Theorem 2 we can thus con-
clude that no pairwise stable network with transfers is under-connected. In fact, it is
straightforward to calculate the efficient networks in this model since the utilitarian
welfare is given by:
wP R(g) =
∑
i∈N
u P Ri (g) =
∑
i∈N
(
di (g)
ρ + D(g) − di (g)c
)
= D(g)
ρ + D(g) − D(g)c.
In this case the utilitarian welfare only depends on the total number of links and
thus any network that contains the optimal number of total links is efficient. The
distribution of links and the structure of the network do not matter for efficiency. We
can easily calculate that for ρ
(ρ+2(k+1))(ρ+2k) < c <
ρ
(ρ+2k)(ρ+2(k−1)) any network
which contains k links is efficient and no other networks are efficient.
It requires a little bit more to characterize stable networks. However, for this matter
we can apply Theorem 2 in order to bound the total number of links.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ρ
(ρ+2k+2)(ρ+2k) < c, then all networks g which are pair-
wise stable with transfers have to contain more than k links, in other words D(g) ≥ 2k.
14 See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) among others.
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In their paper, Goyal and Joshi (2006b) only find a partial characterization for the
set of pairwise stable networks. By applying Theorem 2 we were able to contribute
to their characterization. This example shows that our theorems not only describe the
tension between stability and efficiency, but can also be applied to characterize the
stable networks (resp. the efficient ones).
5 Concluding remarks
We have introduced the notion of over-connected and under-connected networks in
order to contribute to a better understanding of the tension between stability and
efficiency in situations of strategic network formation. An over-connected network
can be socially improved by the deletion of links; an under-connected network can be
socially improved by the addition of links. In that way we relate inefficient outcomes
to externalities of link formation.
The basic argument is that positive spillovers/externalities lead to situations where
agents are not willing to form links, although it would be collectively beneficial.
Negative externalities have the opposite effect: agents form links without internalizing
the loss of utility of other agents. It is illustrated in specific models, that inefficient net-
works in one setting (positive externalities) are under-connected (e.g. the connections
model), while the inefficient networks in the other setting (negative externalities) are
over-connected (e.g. the co-author model). However, this observation does not hold
in general. What can be shown generally, is the following: For positive externalities
no stable network can be over-connected (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1); for negative
externalities no stable network can be under-connected when some other conditions
are met (Theorem 2). Thus, the stable networks in one setting cannot be improved by
the deletion of links, while the stable networks in the other setting cannot be improved
by the severance of links.
Despite their intuitive character, our results are not trivial. As the analysis shows
externalities are not the only source of inefficiency. Other sources of inefficiencies in
the bilateral formation of links are miscoordination of actions in the Consent Game,15
restrictions on possible deviations, and rejection power in the Consent Game. These
three sources of inefficiency are addressed in the basic notions of stability that we use
in our paper. Pairwise stability, for instance, solves the issue of miscoordination in the
Consent Game. The second issue, however, is a problem of pairwise stability itself
since links are considered one by one. A set of links can have contrary effects than
each single link. This is solved by considering pairwise Nash stability (or by assuming
concavity of the utility functions). The third case of inefficiency can be illustrated in
the example where a player rejects a link although the partner would have benefited
heavily from it. This can be ruled out by the introduction of transfers (as used in
Theorem 2).
In the paper, we have restricted our attention to the standard formalization of
networks as undirected graphs without weights. It can be shown that our results can
be straightforwardly extended to the formation of directed unweighted and directed
15 By Consent Game we mean the link announcement game introduced in Myerson (1991).
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weighted networks as introduced in Bala and Goyal (2000), respectively Rogers
(2006). Furthermore, for positive externalities it is possible to show that Nash equilibria
are not over-connected in a framework of formation of undirected and weighted
networks as introduced, e.g. in Bloch and Dutta (2009).16
The contribution of our results is two-fold. First, they shed light into the general
tension between stability and efficiency giving a social planner a clear signal in which
situations rather to impede and when to promote the formation of relationships. Second,
the results can be used in specific models to improve the characterization of stable
and efficient networks. We have illustrated this with two examples, while there are
many other models of strategic network formation that meet the required conditions.
In particular, our results do not rely on assumptions of homogeneous agents, nor on
restrictions to certain notions of stability or efficiency. We hope that future research
will come up with more of such interesting models accounting for the various nature
of social and economic relationships.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 Let g ∈ [P N S(u)] and suppose that u satisfies positive exter-
nalities. We show that for all g′ ⊂ g it holds that ui (g′) ≤ ui (g) for all i ∈ N . Let
l := l(g, g′) = g\g′ for some g′ ⊂ g, and denote li := li (g, g′) = l ∩ Li (g) and
l−i := l\li . Since g is pairwise Nash stable, all owners of a link prefer to have all their
links in g, i.e. ui (g) ≥ ui (g\li ).
Since u satisfies positive externalities, it holds for g˜ := g\li that ui (g˜) ≥ ui (g˜\l−i )
(because player i does not own a link in l−i ), i.e. l−i ∩ Li (g) = ∅). Therefore:
ui (g) ≥ ui (g\li ) ≥ u((g\li )\l−i ) = u(g′). The same argument holds for all i ∈ N ,
implying that w(g) ≥ w(g′) for any welfare function satisfying monotonicity. unionsq
The following lemma from Hellmann (2009) is required for the proof of Corollary 1,
Theorem 2, and Lemma 1. Recall the formal definitions of concavity and convexity
from the literature. Convexity in own current links (Bloch and Jackson 2007): A profile
of utility functions u is convex in own current links if∀i ∈ N ,∀g ∈ G, and ∀l ⊆ Li (g)
it holds that mui (g, l) ≥ ∑i j∈l mui (g, i j). (1-)Concavity in own new links (Calvó-
Armengol and Ilkiliç 2009): A profile of utility functions u is concave in own new links
if for all i ∈ N , for all g ∈ G and for all links l such that l ⊆ Li (gN ), and l ∩ g = ∅
the following holds: mui (g ∪ l, l) ≥ ∑i j∈l mui (g ∪ i j, i j).17 For the definition of
concavity in own links, see Definition 5.
Lemma 2 (Hellmann 2009)
The following statements are equivalent:
(1) u is concave (convex) in own links.
16 In an earlier working paper version of this paper, we have introduced a general framework that allows for
the formation of undirected and (possibly) weighted networks, as well as directed and (possibly) weighted
networks. We show that the central results can be reestablished in this more general setup (see Buechel and
Hellmann 2009).
17 In the published version Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2009) relabel this property as 1-strong submodu-
larity.
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(2) u is concave (convex) in own new links.
(3) u is convex (concave) in own current links.
While it may seem odd that convexity in own current links is equivalent to concavity
in own new links and concavity in own links, the curvature of the utility function is the
same in all setups. Convexity in own current links is a somewhat unusual definition of
convexity of a utility function, since the effects of deleting links need to have a convex
curvature, which implies a concave curvature of the marginal effects of adding links.
The formal proof of equivalence can be found in Hellmann (2009).
Proof of Corollary 1 By Lemma 2 above concavity in own links is equivalent to con-
vexity in own current links. Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2009) show that (1-)convexity
in own links is sufficient for [P S(u)] = [P N S(u)]. Thus, Theorem 1 applies. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 Let g be pairwise stable with transfers. We show that for all g′ ⊃ g
it holds that
∑
i∈N ui (g′) ≤
∑
i∈N ui (g). Suppose that u satisfies negative externalities
and concavity. For g′ ⊃ g, let l := g′\g and for each i ∈ N let li = l ∩ Li (g′) and
l−i := l\li (g, g′). Since u satisfies negative externalities, it holds for all i ∈ N that:
ui (g′) ≤ ui (g′\l−i ). (2)
Concavity is equivalent to concavity in own new links, which implies for all i ∈ N :
ui (g ∪ li ) − ui (g) ≤
∑
j :i j∈li
ui (g ∪ i j) − ui (g). (3)
Now, since g is pairwise stable with transfers (P ST ), (2) and (3) imply:
∑
i∈N
(ui (g′) − ui (g)) =
∑
i∈N
(ui (g ∪ li ∪ l−i ) − ui (g))
(2)≤
∑
i∈N
(ui (g ∪ li ) − ui (g))
(3)≤
∑
i∈N
( ∑
j :i j∈li
[ui (g ∪ i j) − ui (g)]
)
(∗)=
∑
i j∈l
ui (g ∪ i j) − ui (g) + u j (g ∪ i j) − u j (g)
(P ST )≤ 0,
where the equality (*) holds because for each link i j ∈ l it holds that i j ∈ l1(k) if and
only if k ∈ {i, j} and only links in l are considered. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 1 By Lemma 2 it suffices to show that uC O satisfies convexity in own
current links, that is ∀i ∈ N ,∀g ∈ G, and ∀l ⊆ Li (g), it holds that muC Oi (g, l) ≥∑
i j∈l muC Oi (g, i j).
Denote κi (g, l) := {k ∈ N : dik(g) < dik(g\l)} as the set of players whose
distance to player i increases when deleting the set of links l from network g. Since
123
Under-connected and over-connected networks 85
distances cannot decrease when deleting links, we can rewrite marginal utility in the
following way:
muC Oi (g, l)
= wi i +
∑
k =i
δdik (g)wik −
∑
k:ik∈g
cik −
⎡
⎣wi i +
∑
k =i
δdik(g\l)wik −
∑
m:im∈g\l
cim
⎤
⎦
=
∑
k∈κi (g,l)
(δdik(g) − δdik(g\l))wik −
∑
i j∈l
ci j .
Now, consider some network g, some player i and some set of player i ′s links l ⊆
Li (g). Suppose that |l| ≥ 2.18
To show the claim, let us assume the contrary, i.e. muC Oi (g, l) <
∑
i j∈l muC Oi
(g, i j).
mui (g, l) <
∑
i j∈l
mui (g, i j)
∑
k∈κi (g,l)
(δdik(g)− δdik (g\l))wik −
∑
i j∈l
ci j <
∑
i j∈l
⎡
⎣
∑
k∈κi (g,i j)
(δdik(g)−δdik (g\i j))wik −ci j
⎤
⎦
∑
k∈κi (g,l)
(δdik(g) − δdik(g\l))wik <
∑
i j∈l
∑
k∈κi (g,i j)
(δdik(g) − δdik(g\i j))wik (4)
To see that Eq. 4 cannot hold, note the following three properties of geodesic distances
that were also used in Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2009):
1. ∀k ∈ N and ∀i j ∈ l, it holds that (δdik (g) − δdik (g\l))wik ≥ (δdik (g) − δdik (g\i j))wik .
2. For all i j, im ∈ l, it holds that κi (g, i j) ∩ κi (g, im) = ∅.
3.
⋃
i j∈l κi (g, i j) ⊆ κi (g, l).
Thus, we conclude that mui (g, l) ≥ ∑i j∈l mui (g, i j). unionsq
Proposition 1 In the symmetric connections model, gT etra is under-connected with
respect to the utilitarian welfare function for any parameters δ and c, for which gT etra
is pairwise stable.
Proof We have to show that if δ and c are such that gT etra ∈ P S(uδ,c), then ∃g′ ⊃
gT etra for which wδ,c(g′) > wδ,c(gT etra). Specifically, we show that the condition
c ≤ δ − δ8 + δ2 − δ7 + δ3 − δ6 + 2(δ4 − δ5) := ub (5)
is necessary for stability, but sufficient for wδ,c(gT etra ∪{2, 13}) > wδ,c(gT etra). The
labels of the players correspond to Fig. 1.
18 For |l| < 2 the claim mui (g, l) ≥
∑
i j∈l mui (g, i j) trivially holds.
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The first part was done in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) already. Suppose that
c > ub, then player 1 benefits from cutting {1, 2} (because his change in benefits is
just ub).
For the second part denote by βi := ∑ j =i δdi j (gT etra∪{2,13}) −
∑
j =i δdi j (g
T etra) the
marginal benefits for player i and by  := ∑i∈N βi the sum of marginal benefits.
This allows us to write
wδ,c(gT etra ∪ {2, 13}) > wδ,c(gT etra) ⇐⇒  > 2c. (6)
It is straightforward to derive that
β1 = β12 = δ2 − δ4 + δ3 − δ4
β2 = β13 = δ − δ5 + δ2 − δ4 + δ2 − δ5 + 2(δ3 − δ4)
β3 = δ2 − δ5 + δ3 − δ4 + δ3 − δ5
β4 = β7 = β9 = β15 = δ3 − δ4
β14 = δ2 − δ5 + δ3 − δ4 + δ3 − δ5,
and βi = 0 for all other i .
This yields
 = 2(δ − δ5) + 4(δ2 − δ4) + 4(δ2 − δ5) + 12(δ3 − δ4) + 2(δ3 − δ5). (7)
To show that  > 2c under the condition c ≤ ub, it is sufficient to show that  > 2ub
holds. Recall that,
2ub(g) = 2(δ − δ8) + 2(δ2 − δ7) + 2(δ3 − δ6) + 4(δ4 − δ5). (8)
Thus,
 > 2ub ⇐⇒ 6δ2 + 12δ3 − 20δ4 − 4δ5 + 2δ6 + 2δ7 + 2δ8 > 0 (9)
Numerically it can be checked that (9) holds for all δ ∈ (0, 1) (we used Maple). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 Let c < ρ
(ρ+2k+2)(ρ+2k) , then for the welfare maximizing num-
ber of links it holds that 1/2D∗(g) ≥ k. Since any network, which contains 1/2D∗(g)
links is welfare maximizing, any network, which has less than 1/2D∗(g) links is
under-connected. By Theorem 2 no pairwise stable network can be under-connected
since u P R satisfies negative externalities and concavity. Thus, any network g ∈ [P ST ]
has to contain at least 1/2D∗(g) ≥ k links. unionsq
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